

# Oisín N. Deery

(‘Oisín’ is pronounced ‘Oh-Sheen’)

## Curriculum Vitae

Department of Philosophy  
Florida State University  
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### AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION & COMPETENCE

Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Action, Ethics/Moral Psychology, Philosophy of  
Cognitive Science, Metaphysics

### ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT

Philosophy and Science of Self-Control Postdoctoral Research and Teaching Fellow,  
September 2016–present, Department of Philosophy, Florida State University  
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) Postdoctoral Research Fellow,  
2014–16, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona  
Postdoctoral Research Fellow, 2013–14, Université de Montréal

### EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Philosophy, 2013, University of British Columbia  
Visiting Scholar, 2012, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona  
Visiting Graduate Fellow, 2011, The Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University  
M.A. in Philosophy, 2006, University College Cork, Ireland  
B.A. in Philosophy and English, National University of Ireland, Galway

### BOOKS

Under Contract *Free Will, Phenomenology, and Consciousness*, Oxford University Press.  
2013 Paul Russell & Oisín Deery (eds.), *The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential  
Readings from the Contemporary Debates*, Oxford University Press.

### PEER-REVIEWED PAPERS

Forthcoming Oisín Deery & Eddy Nahmias, “Defeating Manipulation Arguments:  
Interventionist Causation and Compatibilist Sourcehood,” *Philosophical  
Studies*. DOI 10.1007/s11098-016-0754-8  
2015 “The Fall from Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn’t Justified by Experience,”  
*Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 93(2): 319–334.  
2015 “Why People Believe in Indeterminist Free Will,” *Philosophical Studies*,  
172(8): 2033–2054.

- 2015 Oisín Deery, Taylor Davis & Jasmine Carey, “The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the Question of Natural Compatibilism,” *Philosophical Psychology*, 28(6): 776–801.
- 2015 Oisín Deery, Taylor Davis & Jasmine Carey, “Defending the Free-Will Intuitions Scale: Reply to Stephen Morris,” *Philosophical Psychology*, 28(6): 808–814.
- 2015 “Is Agentive Experience Compatible with Determinism?” *Philosophical Explorations*, 18(1): 2–19.
- 2013 “Absences and Late Preemption,” *Theoria*, 79(4): 309–325.
- 2013 Oisín Deery, Matt Bedke & Shaun Nichols, “Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency,” in D. Shoemaker (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility*, Oxford University Press. 126–150.
- 2007 “Extending Compatibilism: Control, Responsibility, and Blame,” *Res Publica: A Journal of Legal and Social Philosophy*, 13(3): 209–230.

#### INVITED CHAPTERS

- Forthcoming Oisín Deery & Eddy Nahmias, “The Experience of Free Will,” in J. Campbell (ed.), *A Companion to Free Will*, Wiley-Blackwell.

#### BOOK REVIEWS

- 2015 Review of D. Hodgson, *Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will* (Oxford University Press, 2012), *Mind*, 124(493): 347–351.
- 2013 Review of J. Alexander, *Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction* (Polity, 2012), *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 21(5): 787–791.

#### ARTICLES IN PROGRESS/ UNDER REVIEW

- [1] “Hierarchies in the Visual System” (with Bryan Chambliss)
- [2] “Free Choices Are a Natural Kind”

#### AWARDS & FELLOWSHIPS (in addition to postdoctoral fellowships)

- 2012 Annual Brian Laetz Graduate Student Essay Prize, Department of Philosophy, UBC
- 2011 Visiting Graduate Fellowship, Cornell University
- 2010 Doctoral Fellowship, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC)
- 2009 The Pacific Century Graduate Scholarship, UBC/Ministry of Advanced Education, Province of British Columbia
- 2009 Four Year Doctoral Fellowship (FYF), UBC
- 2009 Tina and Morris Wagner Foundation Fellowship, UBC
- 2008 University of BC Graduate Fellowship, UBC
- 2007 Graduate Entrance Scholarship, UBC

**REFEREED PRESENTATIONS**

- 2016 “Hierarchies in the Visual System,” co-authored paper with Bryan Chambliss, 25th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, November 3–5 (paper)
- 2016 “Moral Responsibility, Situationism, and Implicit Bias,” Gothenburg Responsibility Project Conference, University of Gothenburg, Sweden, August 24–27 (paper)
- 2016 “Impaired Self-Control and Moral Responsibility,” 42nd Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, University of Texas at Austin, June 2–4 (poster)
- 2016 “Compensating for Impaired Self-Control,” Workshop on Free Will and Self-Control, University of Turku, Finland, February 26 (paper)
- 2015 “The Light Cone Limit: Determinism, Prediction, and Causation by Events in the Distant Past,” co-authored paper with Eddy Nahmias, 41st Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, June 4 (poster)
- 2014 “Neuroscience Doesn’t Reveal That There Are No Free Choices (But It Might Tell Us What Free Choice Is),” Conference on Free Will, Center for Cognition and Neuroethics, Flint, Michigan, October 10 (paper)
- 2014 “Prospection and Causal Modeling Explain People’s Belief in Indeterminist Freedom,” 40th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, June 18 (poster)
- 2014 “Causal Modeling and Free Will: A New Approach to Old Problems,” co-authored paper with Eddy Nahmias, 40th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, June 20 (paper)
- 2014 “Indeterminist Phenomenology Is the Source of People’s Belief in Indeterminist Freedom,” Toward a Science of Consciousness 20th Anniversary Conference, Tucson, Arizona, April 25 (paper)
- 2013 “Free Will and Aesthetic Judgment: A Defense of the Agency View,” co-authored paper with Joshua J. Johnston, 51st Annual Meeting of the Alabama Philosophical Society, Pensacola, Florida, October 12 (paper)
- 2012 “Intuitions in a New Light: Expanding the Methods of Experimental Philosophy,” co-authored paper with Taylor Davis and Jasmine Carey, 38th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, University of Colorado, Boulder, June 22 (poster)
- 2012 “Aesthetic Judgments: The Agency View,” co-authored paper with Joshua J. Johnston, Pacific Division Meeting of the American Society for Aesthetics, Pacific Grove, California, April 13 (paper)
- 2011 “Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency,” co-authored paper with Matt Bedke and Shaun Nichols, New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility, New Orleans, November 5 (paper)
- 2010 “Why the Revised Manipulation Argument Fails,” 47th Western Canadian Philosophical Association Meeting, University of Calgary, October 29 (paper)

- 2009 “How Our Experience as Agents is Mistaken if Determinism is True,” 61st annual Northwest Philosophy Conference, Forest Grove, Oregon, October 23 (paper)

### INVITED PRESENTATIONS

- 2016 “Free Choices Are a (Natural) Psychological Kind,” Department of Philosophy, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, February 11
- 2016 “A New Compatibilist Theory of Free Will,” Center for the Philosophy of Freedom, University of Arizona, Tucson, January 28
- 2015 “Methodological Naturalism about Free Choice,” Arizona Cognitive Science Conclave, University of Arizona, Tucson, December 5
- 2015 “The Fall from Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn’t Justified by Experience,” Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, March 24
- 2015 “Explaining the Phenomenology of Free Will,” Department of Philosophy, Rice University, Houston, January 30
- 2014 “Neuroscience, Kinds, and Free Will,” Cognitive Science Colloquium at the University of Arizona, Tucson, November 21
- 2014 “Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist Causation and Compatibilist Sourcehood,” co-authored paper with Eddy Nahmias, Department of Philosophy, University of Nevada Las Vegas, October 24
- 2014 “Moral Responsibility and Freedom,” Joint Workshop of the Centre for Ethics at the University of Toronto and the Centre de Recherche en Éthique de l’Université de Montréal, Toronto, April 10
- 2014 “Against an Argument for Libertarianism,” Workshop at the Centre de Recherche en Éthique de l’Université de Montréal, January 14
- 2013 “A Causal-Modeling Approach to Manipulation Arguments and Frankfurt Cases,” co-authored paper with Eddy Nahmias, Centre de Recherche en Éthique de l’Université de Montréal, November 29
- 2013 “Compatibilism about Agentive Phenomenology,” Conference on the Phenomenology of Free Will and its Epistemological Significance, Fribourg, Switzerland, June 16–19
- 2013 “Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency,” co-authored paper with Matt Bedke and Shaun Nichols, Experimental Philosophy Society Group Session, Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, San Francisco, March 27
- 2013 “The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the Question of Natural Compatibilism,” co-authored paper with Taylor Davis and Jasmine Carey, Philosophy Department Spring Colloquium, University of British Columbia, March 15
- 2012 “Two Varieties of Content for Agentive Experience,” 2nd Workshop on Concepts and Perception: Varieties of Content, Córdoba, Argentina, December 7
- 2010 “Our Experience as Agents, and Why It’s Mistaken,” Columbia College, Vancouver, April 5

**COMMENTS**

- 2016 Discussant (with Robert Kane) on Gregg Caruso, “Free-Will Skepticism and Creativity,” Society for the Philosophy of Creativity Group Session, Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Chicago, March 4
- 2016 Comment on Saba Bazargan, “Accountability and Intervening Agency,” Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Chicago, March 4
- 2014 Comment on Eylem Özaltun, “Knowledge in Action: Less Like Pain, More Like Perception,” Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, San Diego, April 17 (invited)
- 2012 Comment on Ishtiyaque Haji, “Frankfurt Examples Featuring Determinism,” 49th Western Canadian Philosophical Association Meeting, Victoria, B.C., October 20
- 2011 Comment on Eric L. Chwang, “Freedom from Autonomy,” Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, San Diego, April 23
- 2010 Comment on Zachary J. Goldberg, “Van Inwagen’s Two Failed Arguments for the Belief in Freedom,” Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, San Francisco, March 31

**TEACHING: PRIMARY INSTRUCTOR**

- 2016 Philosophy of Mind (PHI 6325), Florida State University (team-taught with Al Mele)
- 2016 Ethical Issues and Life Choices (PHI 2360), Florida State University
- 2016 Existential Problems (PHIL RELI 245), University of Arizona
- 2015 Philosophy of Mind (PHIL COGS 450/550), University of Arizona
- 2012 Introduction to Philosophy (PHIL 102), University of British Columbia
- 2011 Introduction to Philosophy (PHIL 102), University of British Columbia

**PROFESSIONAL SERVICE**

Referee for: *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (2016), *Philosophical Studies* (2016), *Philosophical Explorations* (2016), *Philosophical Quarterly* (2016), Oxford University Press (2016, 2015, 2014), *Philosophical Psychology* (2016, 2014, 2013), *Cognition* (2015), *Feminist Philosophy Quarterly* (2015), *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* (2015, 2013), MIT Press (2013)

Member of Organizing Committee, Society for Philosophy of Agency (2012–present)

**PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS**

American Philosophical Association, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Society for Philosophy of Agency, Philosophy of Science Association